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Part III 
Rights in conflict 
Chapter 12 
Protecting the Tay Nguyen gongs 
Conflicting rights in Vietnam's central 
plateau 
William Logan 
With the emergence of the concept of 'intangible cultural heritage' in the 
last decade, a new set of human rights issues confronts heritage professionals. 
These relate to 'cultural rights'; that is, group and individual rights to main-
tain those heritage elements that underpin cultural identity and to enjoy 
self-determination in cultural terms. There is a need to tread warily in 
dealing with intangible cultural heritage since a totally different set of 
ethical issues arises when seeking to protect 'practices, representations, 
expressions, knowledge, skills' - as the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the 
Safeguarding of Intangible Heritage defines intangible heritage - for these heri-
tage elements are embodied in people. It is not ethically possible to 'own' 
people in the way that we do the tangible heritage of physical places and 
artefacts, nor to buy and sell, destroy, rebuild or preserve them (Logan 
2007a, 2008, 2009 in press). Although the Convention came into force fairly 
quickly with the requisite 30 states signed up by January 2006, a number of 
countries which have a strong record in other forms of cultural heritage con-
servation have misgivings about it and have so far refused to ratify it. 
The Convention refers to the notion of human rights as a way of shaping 
and, indeed, limiting the proposed intangible list. Frequently, however, cul-
tural rights as one form of human rights and the one most directly linked to 
intangible cultural heritage, comes into direct conflict with other human 
rights, such as women's rights, or the rights of children to be children rather 
than young labourers or soldiers. Conceptions of what is essential to cultural 
identity vary, of course, across time and from one part of the world to 
another. But, in some instances, opposing claims to cultural rights may be 
put forward by different groups locked in conflict in the same time and 
place. 
These complexities are discussed in this chapter through a case study of 
the hill-tribes of the Tay Nguyen or Central Highlands region of the Social-
ist Republic of Vietnam. Here claims to the community's right to protect 
traditional culture, including local religious practices, clash with the right 
to religious freedom, especially at the individual level. Complicating the sit-
uation is the underlying resource competition in this part of Vietnam that 
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has boiled over recently into violent clashes with the authorities in 2001 and 
2005. State-initiated population migrations into the central uplands have 
impacted upon Tay Nguyen land tenure rights and created major land use 
changes. The intervention of Christian sects and anti-communist overseas 
Vietnamese (Viet kieu), notably in the United States, adds to the brew. 
Unsurprisingly, the Vietnamese state reasserted its control over the Tay 
Nguyen area and people. Yet, at the same time the state also chose to 
embark upon a campaign to celebrate and protect one of the most distinctive 
features of the Tay Nguyen's intangible heritage, its gong-playing culture. 
Given this complex and highly politicized context, what does the decision 
to inscribe the gong-playing culture mean? The chapter seeks to explicate 
this decision and, in so doing, raises questions about cultural heritage theory 
and practice that relate not only to Vietnam but to other parts of the world 
where there are clashes of rights claims. 
The Tay Nguyen gongs 
In November 2005 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam celebrated the addi-
tion of its 'Tay gong-playing skills' to the then 90-strong list of intangible 
heritage items proclaimed by UNESCO as 'Masterpieces of the Oral and 
Intangible Heritage of Humanity'. This focused the world's attention on the 
plateaus of the mid-Tay Nguyen region which claims to have more gongs 
than any other area inside or outside Vietnam - about 6,000 sets in 20 minor-
ity groups in the four provinces of Dak Lak, Kon Tum, Lam Dong and Gia Lai 
(Pleiku district). Gong-playing has played a central role in the traditional life 
of the Tay Nguyen peoples. According to UNESCO (2006: Section 2.1), the 
gongs are 'permanent historical witness of the development of the people's 
daily lives' and 'the unique symbol of the highlanders' cultural traditions'. 
The gongs are featured in most rituals, such as ceremonies to welcome the 
New Year, celebrate the rice harvest or the construction of a new communal 
house, bid farewell to soldiers going to war and celebrate their victories. 
They mark the life cycle, being used in the thai tai (blowing the ears) cere-
mony to usher the new-born child into life, in weddings and in the ba ma 
(leaving the grave) ceremony to bring the dead to the sacred world. The 
gongs are valued as a medium of communication between people and their 
deities. According to the Central Highlanders' conception, behind each gong 
resides a deity and the older the gongs, the more powerful the deities are 
said to be. Additionally, the gongs have an economic value and represent a 
symbol of wealth and power. A gong set was once as valuable as 30 buffaloes 
but has inflated to 85 or more (Alperson et al. 2007). 
This cultural and economic significance notwithstanding, these days the 
young Tay Nguyen people are seen to be losing interest in gong-playing and 
the gong culture generally, while the men with gong-tuning and playing 
skills are ageing and declining in number (UNESCO 2006: Sections 
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2.1-2.2). Taking advice from Dr Tran Van Khe, an ethnomusicologist at the 
Paris Sorbonne noted for focusing world attention on traditional music, the 
UNESCO Hanoi Office commenced an Action Plan in 2006 to stabilize 
the gong-playing culture. With funding from the government of Norway, 
the project seeks to develop an inventory of practitioners and nomination of 
Figure 12.1 Inter-generational transmission of traditional gong-playing skills 
(Courtesy: UNESCO Hanoi Office). 
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Figure 12.2 Young men learn ing traditional skills in a village gong club (Cour-
tesy: UNESCO Hanoi Office). 
a select group to the Vietnamese Government for recognition as 'National 
Practitioners', to re-energize the village gong clubs so that the skills will be 
better valued and transmitted to young people, to establish training courses 
and to promote gong-playing nationally and internationally through perfor-
mances and publications. 
Minority rights 
The Vietnamese Government selected the gong-playing culture for submis-
sion to the Masterpieces list because it was seen as having the strongest case 
of all the items on the country's own intangible list established under the 
2001 Law on Cultural Heritage. Already the cycle of Nguyen Dynasty court 
music and dance had been inscribed in 2003 as Vietnam's first Masterpiece, 
a paradoxical action by one of the world's remaining communist regimes, as 
Long (2003) has explained. Others on the tentative list include lullabies 
from Central Vietnam, Quan Ho antiphonal singing from 49 villages in Bac 
Ninh Province near Hanoi, Ca Tru singing and instrumental chamber 
music, the dances of the Thai minority, and various kinds of puppetry 
including the internationally known water puppetry developed in Vietnam's 
rice fields (ACCU 1998: 106-7). 
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Vietnam has 54 officially recognized ethnic groups that provide a rich 
cultural diversity and intangible cultural heritage. Two groups make up the 
bulk of the lowlanders - the Kinh who comprise 87 per cent of the total 
Vietnamese population of 85.3 million Guly 2007), and the Hoa (ethnic 
Chinese of the Han linguistic family), who form 1.5 per cent of the total. 
The other minorities mostly live in the mountainous areas and have highly 
complex cultural characteristics. For instance, languages from several ethno-
linguistic families are spoken in villages located in the same valley or even in 
the same village. In the Tay Nguyen region, where the population totals 
over 2 million, the ethnic mix is very varied, with, for instance, the Ba-Na 
belonging to the Mon-Khmer language group living alongside the Gia-Rai 
and Ede who are classified as part of the Austronesian language group. 
Despite their significant cultural differences, in common Kinh parlance 
and in much official policy in Vietnam, the hill-tribes tend to be lumped 
together. The Kinh have traditionally looked down on them, placing little 
value on cultural diversity and wanting to assimilate them into the lifestyle 
of the Kinh majority. They have largely been ignored in histories of 
Vietnam written by the Kinh Viet or the French who colonized Vietnam in 
the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. They played no part 
in imperial Vietnam and, apart from the Catholic missionaries who ven-
tured into the plateaus and mountains, they were largely ignored by the 
colonial French who concentrated in lowland towns and ports. Only where 
French-owned plantations were set up in the mountains or when the colo-
nial government decided to establish a new summer capital at Da Lat on 
the southern edge of the Tay Nguyen region did the French come into close 
contact with them. 
Nearly all the hill-tribes lacked traditional writing skills and their oral 
histories were inaccessible and hence disregarded. Vietnamese ethnologists, 
according to Rambo (2005: 39-40), have been handicapped by reliance on a 
Soviet theoretical commitment to 'a rigidly unilineal model of cultural evo-
lution', with the consequence that the various ethnic groups were placed on 
a 'ladder of evolutionary progress'. Western ethnographers and anthropolo-
gists, at least in colonial times, tended to view all the hill-tribes through 
Orientalist eyes, which, it can be argued, further reinforced the Kinh sense 
of superiority. The early French referred to them as 'sauvages' - a translation 
of the Vietnamese term 'moi' once used for the hill-tribes people. As late as 
1998 a Vietnamese official outlining her country's approach to safeguarding 
intangible cultural heritage at a regional seminar in Tokyo was still able to 
describe 53 of Vietnam's 54 ethnic group cultures as being merely folklore, 
with only the Kinh culture being based on written transmission and scholar-
ship (ACCD 1998: 105). 
Patricia Pelley (1998) describes the efforts made by the Vietnamese gov-
ernment from the 1950s to deal with the ethnic identity question as national 
independence was achieved. One of these was the introduction of legislative 
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and administrative programmes to 'sedentarize the nomads' and to draw the 
younger generation into the mainstream through education policies and 
employment creation. Another effort, striking to the heart of ethnic minority 
identity issues, was to draw up an official list of recognized ethnic groups -
the 54 groups we have been discussing compared with the 90 or so ethnic 
groups recognized by some non-government analyses. As with the appoint-
ment of Buddhist religious leaders, the granting of official recognition was a 
way of bringing the groups under control, of setting in place social structures 
in which a leadership layer felt an obligation to accede to Hanoi's dictates. 
Many of the ethnic minority traditions had been interrupted during the 
long period of independence wars so that the same Vietnamese official speak-
ing in Tokyo could note that even the over 40s generation had forgotten 
their intangible cultural heritage (ACCU 1998: 107). Gong-playing was 
losing its function as a dialogue with the deities and was increasingly 
restricted to traditional ceremonies where it was performed merely as enter-
tainment. In 1977 the national cultural authorities had determined that 
such ceremonies were superstition and they were stopped (ACCU 1998: 
109). A revival began in the 1990s when cultural policies eased and the 
Ministry of Culture and Information, together with the Association of Viet-
namese Folklorists, began to organize annual festivals and competitions at 
ethnic district, provincial and regional levels. 
It is clear that there has been a softening of the assimilationist approach 
in recent times. The speech by Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Thien Nhan 
at a Hanoi education conference in January 2008 typifies this shift (Viet Nam 
News 2008). Reviewing ethnic minority boarding schools' performance in 
the decade 1997-2007 and outlining the course of development to 2010, 
Nhan maintained, on the one hand, that the ethnic minority children were 
not getting enough general education and Vietnamese language instruction 
in the boarding schools created for them. On the other hand, he insisted that 
other educational activities should be organized according to the traditions 
of each ethnic group, such as encouraging students to wear their national 
dress. The pupils would study their ethnic cultures and languages but also 
learn about the other cultures in their areas. 
This policy softening towards ethnic minorities brings the Vietnamese 
Government more closely into line with the various international statements 
on minority rights, such as the United Nations' 1966 International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 1992 Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and 
UNESCO's 2001 Declaration on Cultural Diversity. Nevertheless, to the Viet-
namese majority and the Government of Vietnam today, how to incorporate 
the cultures of the minority hill-tribes peoples into the Vietnamese self-
image continues to be a complex and sensitive issue. This is not merely a 
question of cultural heritage protection; it involves a fundamental ethical, 
political and administrative question: how can Vietnam bridge the economic 
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and cultural divide between the country's dominant lowlanders and the 
ethnic minorities, most of whom live in impoverished circumstances in the 
mountainous north and centre of Vietnam? Of course this is not a dilemma 
just for Vietnam but is replicated in all countries where dominant ethnic or 
racial groups have an advanced standard of living and ethnic or racial minor-
ities live in poverty and ill-health. 
There is also the ongoing argument in Vietnam about the nature of demo-
cracy and the form that best suits the particular needs of the country. The 
Kinh majority governs, but through a political structure still dominated by 
a single party - the Communist Party of Vietnam - although many com-
mentators see the country being transformed by 'creeping pluralism' (Porter 
1993; Logan 2000: ch. 8; Koh 2006). In a democracy, majority rule is appro-
priate; however, it is usually argued that democracies must also respect the 
rights of minority groups, including at least some aspects of their cultural 
identity and underlying heritage. 
Cultural rights 
Indeed the maintenance of one's culture is seen in the UN arena these days 
to be part of one's unalienable human rights. Since at least 1966, when 
UNESCO's General Conference adopted the Declaration on the Principles of 
International Cultural Cooperation, it has become the standard view of the 
international agencies that, as Article 1 states, 'Each culture has a dignity 
and value which must be respected and preserved' and 'every people has the 
right and duty to develop its culture'. Such statements of principle set aside 
the myriad complexities that arise when governments or NGOs seek to 
apply them. All around the world political tensions emerge, for instance, 
when cultural diversity is seen to be undermining the social cohesion of the 
peoples united within a political state or when claims to cultural rights con-
flict with other human rights (Logan 2007b). 
With regard to Vietnam specifically, there is little written about cultural 
rights - or, indeed, human rights generally. The book edited by Oscar Sale-
mink (2001) outlined Vietnam's rich cultural diversity. Originating in a 
1994 UNESCO International Experts Meeting on the 'Preservation and 
Revitalisation of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of the Ethnic Minorities 
in Vietnam', it is an important early attempt to propose measures to preserve 
cultural diversity in a developing country. This helped the push for the 2001 
Law on Cultural Heritage, a law that is advanced by global standards in incor-
porating intangible heritage alongside the tangible. Its implementation is 
less 'advanced', however, in the sense that it relies almost entirely on top-
down governmental and bureaucratic decisions about what is to be regarded 
as significant Vietnamese heritage. Neither Salemink's book nor the law 
refers specifically to the notion of cultural rights or to the difficulties of con-
flicting rights claims. 
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A handful of other publications treat human rights generally in Vietnam. 
The Harvard Law School research associate Ta Van Tai (1988) traced the 
pre-modern Vietnamese record of what we now call human rights, arguing 
that this record matched many of today's international human rights stand-
ards. Vo Van Ai (2000) focused on the contradictions between the post-inde-
pendence official Vietnamese discourse about human rights and the internal 
repression of dissent, but is now outdated. From the point of view of this 
chapter, John Gillespie's 2006 work is most useful, giving a brief outline of 
the place of cultural rights in Vietnamese history before focusing on the 
post-colonial situation. Like Keyes (2008), he sees the official approach in 
Vietnam being essentially inclusive, although assimilationist. He notes that 
Vietnam's 1959 Constitution gave ethnic minorities a degree of autonomy 
as a reward for their support in the anti-colonial struggle. After reunification 
of North and South in 1975, however, while the new 1980 Constitution 
supported policies of equality and rights to culture and language, it gave 
priority to the maintenance of unity among all ethnic groups - the majority 
Kinh and the minorities. This subordination of cultural rights to national 
unity was reaffirmed in the 1992 Constitution. 
A fourth publication on human rights in Vietnam, by Gammeltoft and 
Hern¢ (2000: 475), reinforces the point that the state - through the Minis-
try of Culture (previously Ministry of Culture and Information) - has had 
enormous power to decide which strand or representation of a cultural and 
ethnically diverse society is given legitimacy. The way the ethnic groups are 
identified is dubious, and many have, as Michaud and Turner (2006) point 
out, a transnational identity, either existing in locations subsequently 
bisected when colonial boundaries were imposed or ignoring these and 
moving backwards and forwards across boundary lines on a daily or seasonal 
basis. Gammeltoft and Hern¢ see the MOC's power waning in recent years 
as a result of increased internationalization. They argue that in contrast to 
the officially sanctioned set of Vietnamese values (social duties, collective 
obligations, hierarchically ordered social relations) which dominates the 
public discourse, it is now possible to see notions of rights in the Western 
sense (individual freedom, autonomy, more equal social relations) emerging 
as a 'hidden transcript'. It is true that since the Sixth Party Congress in 1986 
when the doi moi (economic renovation) principles were adopted, Vietnam 
has rejoined the global financial and trading systems and become a major 
target for international tourism. It is also apparent that international tourism 
has been a powerful factor in encouraging the Vietnamese authorities to 
appreciate the hill-tribe people better - if largely as a resource to be 
exploited by the tourism industry. 
Contact with the outside world has brought pop music, Western dress 
and modern hairstyles to the Tay Nguyen young generation. This further 
undermines the distinctive local culture and gives rise to concerns about the 
cultural impact of globalization. From a human rights perspective, the 
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young Tay Nguyen people as individuals should have the right to choose 
their own lifestyle. But what of the group identity and heritage? A major 
difficulty in many of the human rights instruments is that they are con-
cerned more with individual than group, community or societal rights and, 
indeed, have often been criticized as enshrining an individualistic Western 
priority that is not culturally appropriate in many other parts of the world. 
Group rights have become better accommodated, however, since the land-
mark assertion in Article 27 of the 1966 ICCPR that: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess their own religion, or to use their own language. 
In any case, it is questionable how free any of us are as individuals or groups, 
in the West or the non-West, to choose freely in the face of the massive 
taste-formation processes engineered by global companies in the music, 
fashion and media industries. This is precisely the kind of concern about the 
perceived negative impacts of globalization that led to UNESCO's adoption 
in 2005 of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cul-
tural Expressions. 
Economic rights 
The question arises how best to protect the cultural rights of ethnic minority 
groups. Is the commodification of their cultures through cultural tourism a 
problem that requires a policy response, or is it, on the contrary, part of the 
solution? The 1986 doi moi economic reforms have clearly improved life for 
the minorities in Vietnam. Many tribes traditionally suffered from malaria, 
iodine deficiency, tuberculosis and scabies, and their children were kept at 
home to work the land. The hill-tribe people remained largely illiterate in a 
country whose national literacy rate is claimed to have reached around 90 
per cent under the communist regime by the 1980s. Since then the tyranny 
of remoteness has been reduced, giving better access to health care and 
education. 
Clearly many members of ethnic groups see the paid employment in jobs 
often controlled by the Kinh as the way to move out of the poverty that sur-
rounds most of the minorities. Under such circumstances, it is not ethically 
easy to argue for the maintenance of traditional ways of life. Indeed, some 
Asian countries have argued vehemently that to prevent development would 
be acting against their people's basic human right to live free from poverty. 
This view was codified in The Bangkok Declaration, signed at an Asian 
regional meeting of the UN World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, 
which asserted that 'all countries, large and small, have the right to 
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determine their political systems, control and freely utilize their resources, 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development' (Article 
6). While recognizing that human rights are universal in nature, the Decla-
ration insists that they 'must be considered in the context of a dynamic and 
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the signifi-
cance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural 
and religious backgrounds' (Article 8). In short, the articulation of these 
views in the 1990s - often referred to as the 'Asian values debate' - took the 
exceptionalist position that conditions in Asia were different and that the 
right to protect cultural traditions had to be set aside until such time as 
standards of living had improved through economic development. 
A question for heritage professionals, therefore, is how to respond to situ-
ations where local communities prefer to achieve higher standards of living 
by rejecting tradition and modernizing their cultures. Is it an appropriate 
response to try to shore up the traditional behaviours and skills that make 
up their intangible cultural heritage? In the Tay Nguyen case, does the pro-
gramme to protect the gong-playing culture fly in the face of the rights of 
Tay Nguyen people to modernize and achieve better living standards? Or 
will it have the effect of turning a traditional set of skills into an economic 
resource that will help achieve these social goals? 
In fact, since the opening up of Vietnam to the global economy and inter-
national tourism the market has taken on a primary role in shaping the 
country's 'new cultural heritage' (Logan 2009). Alongside the feudal Sino-
Viet heritage that gives the Kinh their sense of pedigree and the twentieth-
century legacy of the independence struggle under Ho Chi Minh and the 
socialists, the French cultural layer is now firmly included, thanks largely to 
French media and tourist interests as well as the efforts of the French gov-
ernment and investors to restore France-Vietnam links. It was slower for the 
ethnic minorities in the mountains to have their cultures recognized as an 
integral part of the national culture due to the national campaign to force 
the minorities to assimilate with the mainstream. But already tourism is 
having a significant impact on remote hill-tribe people in places such as Sapa 
in the north, an impact that needs to be carefully monitored to ensure that 
tourism does not destroy aspects of the hill-tribe culture that the people 
themselves see as critical identity supports. 
Political rights 
Vietnam is one of the world's few remaining communist countries and polit-
ical rights, especially to form opposition parties, are severely restricted. Even 
now, according to Chen (2006: 54), Vietnam severely limits civil and polit-
ical rights in order to maintain the one-party rule that is seen as essential to 
hold the country together and to prosper. Chen notes that religious organi-
zations and activities are tightly regulated by law and that the media are 
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state owned, editors are subject to control and politically sensitive issues are 
not able to be discussed. Nevertheless, some environmental and heritage 
issues, such as the Golden Hanoi Hotel issue (Logan 2002, 2006), have gen-
erated public controversy and show that state power can be brought to a 
standstill by culture on occasions. Commentators such as Gillespie (2006) 
and Chen (2006) also believe the situation is improving. Chen argues (p. 
509) that the future of human rights in Asia turns on shifting attitudes in 
China, Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia and is 'cautiously optimistic'. 
Gillespie (pp. 452-7) sees in Vietnam today the state permitting an increas-
ingly diverse range of associations to flourish, even if political associations 
remain tightly controlled; the state is using more and more rights-based 
arguments to balance the public good against individual civil, political and 
economic rights. Having adopted a mixed-market economy, it is indeed hard 
to see how further political liberalization in Vietnam will not occur, the 
'creeping pluralism' mentioned previously. 
In one sense the ethnic minorities are well served in terms of political 
rights: they are given preferential access under the electoral laws to approxi-
mately 15 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly and 10 per cent in 
the Vietnamese Communist Party's central committee. This limited affirma-
tive action began in the 1990s and the first ethnic minority representative 
became a member of the Communist Party's Politburo and chairman of the 
National Assembly in 1992. This was more than tokenism according to 
many observers (The Economist 1992). However, the ethnic groups rarely vote 
as a bloc, according to Gillespie (2006: 476), and are more likely to repre-
sent regional party or national views than any cohesive ethnic perspective. 
In other ways their political activities seem more restricted or at least 
carefully monitored. This follows from a long history of political instability 
in the upland plateaus and highlands of Vietnam and resistance by the hill-
tribes to mainstream Kinh Vietnamese governments, whether of the capital-
ist South or communist North. In the early 1960s the Central Highlanders 
fought President Ngo Dinh Diem's transplantation of northern Catholics onto 
their lands. In the 1970s and 1980s many fought with the French and Ameri-
cans against the communists. They formed a small insurgency movement 
called FULRO (Front Uni pour fa Liberation des Races Opprimes or Unified Front 
for the Struggle of Oppressed Races). As a result they found themselves dis-
trusted by the communist governments that were established in the North 
from 1955 and in unified Vietnam after 1975. The failed attempt by the 
Hanoi government to outlaw the hill-tribes' traditional customs and lan-
guage in the 1970s has been mentioned. Of course, official suspicion of the 
hill-tribes' motivations partly reflected a general anxiety about state independ-
ence, territorial integrity and social cohesion, all of which needs to be under-
stood in the context of a nation that fought for generations against Chinese and 
Western colonial dominance. 
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Land use rights 
In Tay Nguyen country, however, human rights issues remain highly sensi-
tive, ostensibly as a result of a number of land rights-based clashes between 
the hill-tribes and the authorities in the last ten years. Elsewhere in this 
volume Jen§mie Gilbert sees land competition as the common and greatest 
source of tension between dominant and minority groups wherever indi-
genous peoples exist because the heritage that is the basis of their identity 
and existence as distinctive groups is deeply embedded in land and there-
fore linked to the protection of traditional territories. In the central 
plateaus, land competition was certainly high among the key historical, 
demographic and political factors that had created a climate of intense frus-
tration and seemed to dash, yet again, the ethnic minorities' longstanding 
hopes of gaining independence. They saw a steady stream of Kinh Viet 
immigrants into what used to be almost their exclusive home, a result both 
of government-sponsored resettlement schemes aimed at easing population 
pressure in lowland Vietnam and spontaneous migration since 1975 (Evans 
1992). 
The 1992 Constitution stipulates that the country belongs to all the 
people (Article 17) and the state manages the land (Article 18). State law 
supporting lowland immigration and agricultural investment in the high-
lands overrides customary law and 'strikers} at the heart of minority cultural 
practices and communal relationships grounded in a swidden [shifting slash-
and-burn} agricultural economy' (Gillespie 2006: 476). The hill-tribes often 
lack official titles to the large tracts of customary forest land that they occu-
pied, but a national land-titling programme made problems worse when 
land use rights were issued to them because this converted land into an 
alienable commodity and, according to Gillespie, exposed the hill-tribes to 
unscrupulous lowland settlers and corrupt local officials and eventual dispos-
session in some localities. High illiteracy rates led to the perception that 
Hanoi discriminated against them in education, health and other social 
service provisions. In 1999-2000 plummeting coffee prices made worse the 
already high poverty levels, setting the scene for a political crisis. 
In February 2001, several thousand members of Tay Nguyen minorities 
held a series of demonstrations calling for independence, return of ancestral 
lands and religious freedom - in defiance of the state constitution and law. 
An official reaction was to be expected and, indeed, the Vietnamese authori-
ties responded with a show of force, deploying police and soldiers to disperse 
the protesters. Authorities arrested hundreds of highlanders, sometimes, 
according to the US-based Human Rights Watch (HR W 2002), using 
torture to elicit confessions and public statements of remorse. Travel was 
restricted in and out of the region and the 1,000 or so highlanders who fled 
across the national border were forcibly repatriated by Cambodia and pun-
ished by the Vietnamese authorities. The political conflict focused attention 
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on the land rights conflicts in the Central Highlands and has produced at 
least one scholarly analysis (see McElwee 2008). These disturbances broke 
out again in April 2004. The central plateaus were" closely monitored and at 
times closed off to foreign diplomats, journalists and tourists (Asian Centre 
for Human Rights 2004). 
Religious rights 
The HR W points to generalized human rights violations, including the use 
of excessive punishment, violation of the right to freedom of assembly, and 
violation of the right" to freedom of religion. The last-named is seen in the 
destruction and/or closure of churches and official pressure on Christians to 
abandon religion under threat of legal action or imprisonment. But this 
picture is complicated by the presence of foreign evangelical Protestant sects 
- an intervention that fans Hanoi suspicions of deliberate US-backed involve-
ment. According to HR W (2006: 2), the Vietnamese government has per-
sistently blamed the turmoil on agitation and manipulation of the local 
population by 'hostile foreign forces', meaning Montagnard groups in the 
US demanding religious freedom, land rights and a separate state, and using 
religion as a cover for separatist political activities. The Hanoi government's 
perception that this amounts to a threat to national unity is fuelled by the 
link between some independence advocates and former members of the now 
pro-US FULRO. Although FULRO's armed struggle effectively died out in 
1992, many members at that time converted to Christianity (HRW 2002: 
9) and some moved to the US where they formed a Montagnard Foundation 
Inc. Led by a Gia Rai-American, Kok Ksor, this organization has been 
among those accused by the Vietnamese Communist Party of organizing the 
February 2001 demonstrations. 
Neither the HRW nor Amnesty International totally rejects Hanoi's 
interpretation. Indeed, HR W openly acknowledges that the recent upsurge 
in adherence to Protestant evangelical Christianity was at least one of the 
causes of conflict. There were American Protestant missionaries working in 
the area and there was clear evidence of Internet messages from Tay Nguyen 
minority groups based in the US in the days leading up to the outbreak of 
violence. Whether this amounted to a deliberate bid to unsettle the Hanoi 
government's hold on the area has yet to be clearly demonstrated. In any event, 
a crack-down on some foreign missionary activities followed, notably on the 
Dega Protestant sect (Tin Lanh Dega in Ede language, literally 'Sons of the 
Mountains Good Word Church'). Dega Christianity is linked with Ksor's 
effort to build support for an independent 'Dega' homeland in 2000 (HR W 
2002: 9), making it no surprise that the sect is officially banned. HRW esti-
mated in 2002 that more than 250,000 (25 per cent) of the Tay Nguyen 
hill-tribe population were Christian, with the 'Dega Christians' being a sig-
nificant sub-set. Another sect, the New Life Fellowship Vietnam, which had 
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been started in the mid-1980s by an American couple, had its worship serv-
ices stopped by the police in August 2005. 
But as well as cracking down on some foreign missionary activities, 
several other missionaries have been recognized. This follows Hanoi's stand-
ard practice of dealing with religious groups. As with all organizations, the 
government bans independent religious associations and only recognizes 
those that have been approved by the Vietnamese Communist Party's 
Fatherland Front. However, by international comparison the Vietnamese 
state's attitude to religion has been relatively benign. Buddhist, Daoist and 
Confucian temples and pagodas and Christian churches were not closed 
down even during the height of ideological purity in the 1960s and 1970s, 
although the powerful Buddhists lost control over much property. The gov-
ernment insisted that it would recognize only one Buddhist organization 
and that it had the right to veto leadership appointments. There had been 
four government-sanctioned religions in Vietnam up until the Tay Nguyen 
crisis: the Vietnam Buddhist Church, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and the Catholic 
Church. In April 2001 the Evangelical Church of Vietnam (ECVN) was 
added to the list. Established in 1911 and known in Vietnamese as Tinh 
Lanh ('Good News'), its branches had developed a strong Vietnamese 
leadership structure and more than 100,000 adherents. During 2005 a 
further 29 of the 1,200 ethnic minority churches closed in 2001 were regis-
tered by the government and re-opened, while local officials turned a blind 
eye to religious gatherings in numerous unregistered church houses (HR W 
2006: 3-4). 
In its June 2006 report on the Vietnamese national situation, HRW took 
the view that Vietnamese officials, recent reforms notwithstanding, were 
blurring the lines, not making the distinctions required by international 
law, and continuing to crack down on what should be protected polit-
ical and religious expressions and behaviour. This is a violation of the 
basic human rights that Vietnam is obligated to uphold as a signatory 
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. (p. 2) 
Amnesty International (2004) agreed, insisting that: 
Whilst there is no doubt that overseas Montagnard groups have been 
linked to the public protests both in 2001 and April 2004, Amnesty 
International believes that to blame 'outsiders' for the unrest avoids 
addressing fundamental and underlying problems including land rights' 
pressures from internal migration and differences of religion and 
culture. 
From the Vietnamese government's point of view, as Gillespie points out, 
'State tolerance of religious activity is predicated ... on religions contribut-
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ing to state socio-economic objectives. Religions must generate patriotic 
sentiments and uphold the "Great Unity'" (pp. 459-60). Thus the authori-
ties maintain that their treatment of religions has· always been consistent 
with provisions in the International Convention on Religious Freedom that 
permits states to prohibit religious activities that infringe 'political security 
and social order'. 
It is easy for political prejudices to come into play with regard to the 
right of sovereign nations with popularly elected governments to rule 
without external interference. But how does one judge this scenario in terms 
of cultural rights? Should the foreign missionaries be stopped because they 
are undermining the traditional culture of the ethnic minority group? Or 
does that infringe the minority group's and the individual's right to choose 
whatever religion they want? HRW claims that recent reforms liberalizing 
religious activity in the Tay Nguyen region are in response to US designa-
tion of Vietnam in 2004 as 'Country of Particular Concern' for religious 
freedom violations. The US does not officially acknowledge involvement in 
the missionary activities in Vietnam, in the same way that it is not seen to 
back the Fa Lun Gong in China. But adopting Nye's concept of 'soft power' 
(2004), it can be argued that the US seeks to exert influence by setting the 
discourse, using human rights arguments to undercut the Vietnamese 
regime's status in the eyes of the world. Such tactics fit the American state's 
continuing attack on socialist states and its apparent inability to accept its 
loss in the Vietnam War. One conclusion that might be drawn is that this is 
primarily about power in the global setting, and only secondarily about 
human rights - and even further down the track about cultural diversity and 
cultural heritage. 
Rights to self-determination 
This chapter has sought to highlight the various conflicting rights claims 
made by or involving the Tay Nguyen people. In this context, what does 
Vietnam's inscription of the gong-playing culture onto the UNESCO intan-
gible heritage list signify? The Vietnamese government's action seems para-
doxical but most likely reflects a carefully thought-out pragmatic position. 
Bolstering traditional elements of Tay Nguyen minority culture seems at 
first glance to run against the government's worry that the hill-tribes' desire 
to differentiate themselves from the majority population threatens national 
unity. However, it may show a realization that the recent political unrest is 
linked to the lack of economic and educational opportunities and that certain 
cultural practices, such as gong-playing, can be cultivated as economic 
resources to draw revenue into the Tay Nguyen region through increased 
cultural tourism. If this is the case, then the tourism industry is again clearly 
at the forefront of the re-valorization of Vietnam's minority cultures as it has 
been among the ethnic minority groups around Sapa in the north. 
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Other tourism projects, including the development of ecomuseums in 
Daklak Province, are being promoted by the central and provincial govern-
ments. But by promoting the gongs through UNESCO, the government can 
be seen to be working at the highest international level to support the local 
traditions and, at the same time, helping to raise living standards. This may 
have the effect of placating local separatist voices and of quietly drawing the 
Tay Nguyen minority into the mainstream through increasing their eco-
nomic links to the national and international tourism industries. This does 
not appear to mean that the general assimilationist approach has been aban-
doned, but merely that there has been some further softening in that 
approach. Of course, the recognition by the world community of the high 
level of significance of the Tay Nguyen gong-playing also impacts upon the 
attitudes of mainstream Vietnamese. It is therefore likely that nominating 
the gong-playing culture to UNESCO is seen as a way of using cultural her-
itage as a focus of national Vietnamese pride and nation-state formation 
more generally. 
But perhaps this is attributing a more strategic approach on the part of 
the central government than has really existed. Nominating the gongs may 
simply have been the result of the normal activities of the responsible gov-
ernment department, the Ministry of Culture (now reconfigured as the Min-
istry of Culture, Sport and Tourism), and the Vietnamese National 
Commission for UNESCO. It was their responsibility to propose heritage 
items to UNESCO and, as mentioned, the gong-playing culture was seen to 
have the strongest case. Perhaps the national government in Hanoi, the pro-
vincial authorities and the gong-players themselves had little involvement in 
the decision-making process. While further investigation is required to 
clarify this point, such a conclusion would be in line with Porter's view 
(1993) that Vietnam is governed by a system of bureaucratic socialism in 
which the bureaucrats made and implemented decisions on behalf of the 
one-party state and the general public had little role to play or influence. 
In any event, the gong-playing culture was successfully nominated and 
the UNESCO Action Plan is under way. An inaugural gong culture festival 
was held in November 2007 in Buon Me Thuot city. Aimed at 'honouring 
the gong culture and improving the community's awareness of the need to 
preserve this valuable culture', it attracted 25 gong performance groups, 
including one from Laos and another from the Republic of Korea (My An 
2008: 37). Meanwhile, the Viet Nam Folk Art Association, a group of dedi-
cated folklore experts, ethnomusicologists and culture bureaucrats under the 
leadership of Professor To Ngoc Thanh, has been working on a 'Vision 2010' 
programme to build up a network of gong-players and supporters (Viet Nam 
News 2005). Membership now stands at almost 1,000 but, since they are 
mostly between 60 and 70 years old, the sustainability of the group is in 
question. What will be the worth of Tay Nguyen's gong-playing if the 
living context is lost? Performances may be sound- or video-recorded, the 
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instruments collected in museums, and the skills handed down to an elite 
group of players trained in specially funded schools. A poor alternative is for 
gong-playing to become a show for tourists, exotic but ultimately empty. 
Conflicting rights claims make the task of the heritage professional 
exceedingly difficult. How do we respond as professionals to instances where 
various claims to cultural practices based on human rights are in conflict 
with each other? How do we deal in practice with situations where cultural 
heritage is used by powerful actors, both domestic and external, to obtain 
political goals that are essentially unrelated to heritage conservation? Our 
personal world view inevitably comes into play in setting the parameters for 
how we intervene as professionals. But, if we have the freedom of choosing 
how to act, so too should the individuals whose heritage we are considering. 
Not only is the ability to maintain one's culture a form of human rights, but 
more fundamental is the right to determine one's own life circumstances. In 
Tay Nguyen country we have clearly seen how people, as groups and indi-
viduals, want secure food and water supplies and improved housing and 
hygiene. Abandoning, modifying or commodifying traditional culture may 
be the price to be paid for winning improved standards of living. Let them 
decide for themselves. 
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